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COMMENTS 
REPRESENTING NONCITIZENS IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: 
RESOLVING UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN 





In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an 
attorney is obligated to tell a noncitizen client that pleading guilty to a 
crime may result in the client’s forced removal from the United States.
1
  
The defendant, Jose Padilla, claimed that his counsel failed to advise him 
that choosing to plead guilty might result in his deportation.  This failure, 
Padilla argued, violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel.
2
  The Court agreed: “constitutionally competent counsel would 
have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject 
to automatic deportation.”
3
  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned 
that “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of 
deportation as a risk of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of 
deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”
4
 
Two major issues remain unresolved in the wake of this pivotal 
opinion.  First, the Supreme Court did not say whether its decision should 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.  To date, only three federal 
circuit courts have decided whether defendants whose convictions are final 
should be able to seek relief based on Padilla.
5
  As a result, most lower 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2012; B.A., 
Northwestern University, 2006. 
1 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
2 Id. at 1481–82. 
3 Id. at 1478. 
4 Id. at 1486. 
5 United States v. Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 
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courts are forced to revisit this issue anew every time a defendant raises 
Padilla to challenge a final conviction.  Second, it is uncertain whether 
Padilla will actually prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The Court remanded the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court 
because it concluded that Padilla’s entitlement to relief “will depend on 
whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result [of counsel’s deficient 




Further clarification of these issues is imperative.  These issues impact 
the lives of some of the most vulnerable people in the country—
noncitizens.  Today, noncitizens, whether illegal aliens or lawful permanent 
residents, can be removed from the United States for even the most minor 
drug offenses.
7
  Once removed, the individual is often barred from coming 
back to the United States.
8
  So for an individual without United States 
citizenship, being found guilty in a criminal case means facing punishment 
associated not just with the crime itself, but also with the individual’s legal 
status in the country.  In light of these high stakes, federal and state courts 
throughout the United States require guidance to address immigration issues 
in criminal proceedings in a way that is uniform, just, and efficient.  
Lacking such guidance, they must apply the standard announced in Padilla, 
but with little direction as to whether the decision allows for retroactive 
application and what kind of “prejudice” a noncitizen defendant must prove 
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This Comment argues that Padilla v. Kentucky should be applied 
retroactively because it did not announce a new constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure.  Next, this Comment argues that Jose Padilla was 
“prejudiced” and therefore meets the requirement under Strickland v. 
Washington for showing that his Sixth Amendment right was violated.
9
 
Part II provides the background for this Comment, beginning in Part 
II.A with a description of the recent convergence of immigration and 
criminal law.  Part II.B provides background on the Sixth Amendment and 
 
2011) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule and is not retroactively applicable to cases 
on collateral review); Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623, 2011 WL 3705173, at *1 (7th 
Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (same); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that Padilla did not announce a new rule and is retroactively applicable). 
6 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487. 
7 Id. at 1477 n.1. 
8 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 41–44 (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/REVISED Padilla v. Kentucky Reference 
Guide_11-8-10.pdf (discussing the grounds for inadmissibility and bars on readmission). 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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Strickland v. Washington.  Part II.C explores implications of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Padilla and the standard for retroactivity under Teague 
v. Lane.  Part III provides support for the arguments that Padilla should be 
applied retroactively and that on remand, Jose Padilla should prevail on his 
claim. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE NEW “CRIMMIGRATION” SYSTEM 
Between 2003 and 2008, the United States government removed 
nearly 1.5 million noncitizens from the country.
10
  In the last decade, the 
number of foreign nationals deported from the United States has doubled.
11
  
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky recognized that these numbers 
increased so dramatically because of changes in immigration law.
12
  In fact, 
the Court appeared concerned with the increasingly punitive nature of 
criminal law for noncitizens.
13
  The lack of consensus in the opinion, 
however, highlights the controversies lying at the heart of the case related to 
immigration and criminal law.
14
 
Criminal law in the United States is a harsh and unpredictable system 
for noncitizens.
15
  In the first paragraph of the opinion, the Court observes 
that “Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the 
most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense.”
16
  Given the 
state of the law, the Court stressed that deportation for noncitizens who 
commit a removable offense is “practically inevitable,” barring a decision 





10 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565 (2010) 
(stating that 1,446,338 noncitizens were removed from the United States between 2003 and 
2008). 
11 Kyung Jin Lee, U.S. Deportations Double over 10 Years, MEDILL REPORTS (Feb. 23, 
2010), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=157904. 
12 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–79. 
13 See id. 
14 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.  Justice Alito concurred, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.  See id. at 1477. 
15 See Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know 
the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 48 (2010) 
(“Noncitizen criminal defendants find themselves on unequal footing with U.S. citizen 
defendants.  Noncitizens are often subjected to disparate treatment in bail and sentencing 
because of their immigration status.”) (citations omitted). 
16 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
17 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
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Padilla thus deals with an area of law that has harsh consequences for 
defendants who often have little or no knowledge of the American legal 
system and whose criminal defense attorneys may not adequately research 
the impact of the defendant’s immigration status on their criminal case.
18
  
The Court’s discussion reflects a theme recognized by scholars and 
commentators: the increasing criminalization of immigration.
19
  Others refer 
to the new “crimmigration system.”
20
  Indeed, “the preoccupation with 
enforcement has left noncitizens in deportation proceedings exposed to 
large risks of error when the personal stakes are high.”
21
  The potential 
consequences—being forced to leave the United States and to separate from 
one’s family—are serious.  According to Professor Cruz, “[w]ithout 
knowledge of the immigration consequences of a conviction, or the 
individual’s eligibility for immigration relief in general, defense counsel 
may not be able to diffuse the fears that cloud the noncitizen judgment, 
resulting in hasty plea decisions.”
22
  As a result, she argues, “[i]gnorance 
and marginalization of immigration law in the adjudication of a criminal 
case involving a noncitizen can be catastrophic.”
23
 
Before analyzing the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Padilla described how changes in federal immigration 
law over the last century “have expanded the class of deportable offenses 
and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of 
deportation.”
24
  As a result, the Court observed, “[t]he ‘drastic measure’ of 
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes.”
25
  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) sets forth classes of deportable aliens.
26
  For example, if an alien is 
convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude, he or she is 
automatically deportable.  As for drug offenses, the law reads: 
[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or 
 
18 Id. at 1483 (“Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, 
in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in [immigration law].”). 
19 Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 476 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost 
Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 670 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 
(2006). 
21 Legomsky, supra note 19, at 469. 
22 Cruz, supra note 15, at 61–62. 
23 Id. at 62. 
24 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
25 Id. 
26 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
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a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense 




In light of the state of the law, the Court insisted that accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens in criminal proceedings “has never been more 
important” because “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the 
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”
28
 
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
Because of Padilla, defendants in deportation proceedings can now 
contend that their counsel was deficient for not advising that their guilty 
plea could lead to deportation.  However, as the Court recognized, “it is 
often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to 
satisfy” the standard under the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington.
29
  
That standard requires defendants to show both that counsel’s performance 
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that “in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.”
30
  The first prong of Strickland’s two-prong test 
requires that, “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”
31
  The second prong, known as the prejudice prong, 
requires the defendant to “show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.”
32
  A defendant seeking to prevail on a Strickland claim must 
show that both prongs have been satisfied.
33
 
Because it is so common for defendants to plead guilty in criminal 
proceedings,
34
 the Court has “long recognized that the negotiation of a plea 
 
27 Id. 
28 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
29 Id. at 1485 n.12; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
32 Id. at 687; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (“[T]o satisfy 
[Strickland’s] ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”). 
33 See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2000) (“[The defendant] must satisfy both 
prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.”). 
34 Joanne Gottesman, Avoiding the “Secret Sentence”: A Model for Ensuring that New 
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bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.”
35
  The overwhelming majority of 
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.
36
  When a defendant enters a 
guilty plea, that plea must “represent[] a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
37
  Hill v. 
Lockhart established that Strickland applies to an attorney’s advice 
regarding a guilty plea.
38
  Therefore, a defendant can successfully argue that 
his or her guilty plea was not “voluntary and intelligent” if the defendant 
can show that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient and that the 
defendant pled guilty as a result. 
C. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
1. Jose Padilla’s Path to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Defendant Jose Padilla was born in Honduras but lived in the United 
States as a legal permanent resident for over forty years.
39
  He also served 
his country as a member of the United States military during the Vietnam 
War.
40
  In 2001, Padilla was indicted for and pled guilty to trafficking 
marijuana.
41
  In 2004, Padilla found himself in deportation proceedings.
42
  
Realizing he was in deportation proceedings because of his guilty plea, 
Padilla filed a petition for postconviction relief
43
 on the grounds that he was 
 
Jersey Criminal Defendants Are Advised About Immigration Consequences Before Entering 
Guilty Pleas, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 357, 359 (2009). 
35 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
36 Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 697 (2002) ( “[O]ver ninety percent 
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.”). 
37 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). 
38 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (“We hold . . . that the two-part Strickland v. 
Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”). 
39 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477. 
40 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
41 Id. (“Padilla was indicted . . . for trafficking in more than five pounds of marijuana, 
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer 
without a weight and distance tax number.  Padilla, represented by counsel, moved to enter a 
guilty plea to the three drug-related charges, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining 
charge, and a total sentence of ten years on all charges.  The plea agreement provided that 
Padilla would serve five years of his ten year sentence, and would be sentenced to probation 
for the remaining five years.  Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002.”). 
42 Id.  Under immigration law, any noncitizen who commits an aggravated felony, as 
Padilla did, is automatically deportable.  See supra Part II.A; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
LITIGATION, supra note 8, at 9; see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (noting that Padilla’s 
guilty plea made his deportation “virtually mandatory”). 
43 The purpose of postconviction relief is 
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denied his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  In his petition, Padilla contended that his counsel should have 
informed him that pleading guilty might have negative immigration 
consequences.  Instead, his counsel allegedly told him not to worry about 




After the trial court denied Padilla’s motion for postconviction relief, 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing.
45
  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that Padilla did 
not have a claim for relief.
46
  It reasoned that because “collateral 
consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to advise 
Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly 
provides no basis for relief.”
47
  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide “whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel 
had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading 
guilty would result in his removal from this country.”
48
 
Overruling the Kentucky Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to advise 
Padilla that his drug conviction rendered him vulnerable to automatic 
deportation.
49
  It concluded that given the seriousness of deportation as a 
consequence of a guilty plea, “advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.”
50
  Furthermore, “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment 
precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a risk of a criminal plea, and 
the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this 
country demand no less.”
51
 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
argument that because deportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal 
 
to provide a means of inquiry into the alleged constitutional infirmity of a judgment or sentence, 
and to afford a simple and efficient remedy to any prisoner who claims that his or her conviction 
was obtained by a disregard of the fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2223 (2006). 
44 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483 (stating that Padilla’s counsel allegedly advised that “he 
‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long’”). 
45 Id. at 484. 
46 Id. at 485. 
47 Id. 
48 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1482. 
51 Id. at 1486. 
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conviction, counsel is not required to advise his client of possible 
deportation.
52
  The Court acknowledged that the distinction between direct 
and collateral consequences was not entirely clear.  However, the Court had 
never applied the direct–collateral distinction in the context of a Strickland 
claim.
53
  Even so, the distinction was not at issue in Padilla’s case “because 
of the unique nature of deportation.”
54
  The close link between deportation 
and the criminal process made deportation “uniquely difficult to classify as 
either a direct or collateral consequence.”
55
  Finding that Padilla could raise 
a Strickland claim, the Court then applied the first prong of the Strickland 
analysis—whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”
56
  The Court held that counsel’s performance 
was not objectively reasonable because current professional norms dictated 
that attorneys must advise clients of deportation risks in criminal 
proceedings and because counsel should have realized that Padilla was 
deportable “simply from reading the text of the [immigration] statute.”
57
 
Finally, the Court concluded that “[i]t is our responsibility under the 
Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or 
not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”
58
  The serious 
consequences of not protecting noncitizen defendants from this risk 




2. Implications of the Decision 
For some observers, Padilla marks a transformation in the criminal 
justice system.
60
  Padilla requires defense attorneys who were not “well 
versed” in immigration law before to have at least some understanding of 
immigration law.
61
  To that end, the federal government, as well as many 
state governments, have issued new manuals to train attorneys.
62
  The U.S. 
 
52 Id. at 1481. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1482. 
56 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 686, 688 (1984). 
57 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83. 
58 Id. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
59 Id. 
60 Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. 
Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 21 (“There are only a handful of Supreme Court 
decisions in the past 50 years that can be said to have transformed the operation of the 
criminal justice system.  Padilla v. Kentucky may be such a case.”). 
61 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, supra note 8. 
62 The Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation in 2010 issued a 
comprehensive overview of the Immigration and Nationality Act provisions relevant to 
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Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation acknowledged 
that because of Padilla, “it is even more important than ever for 
prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and other interested parties at the 
federal and local levels to have a basic understanding of the immigration 
consequences that flow from an alien’s guilty plea.”
63
 
For noncitizen defendants, Padilla provides a better chance to 
challenge their criminal convictions in cases where they did not realize that 
pleading guilty could lead to removal from the United States.  The Court’s 
decision, however, does not guarantee criminal defendants a successful 
challenge to their guilty pleas.
64
  Padilla only addressed the first prong of 
the Strickland two-prong test and left open the question of whether 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
65
 
After Padilla, a defendant may assert that if it were not for counsel’s 
bad advice, he or she would have chosen to go to trial rather than entering a 
guilty plea.  However, because in most cases the defendant’s conviction is 
already final, the defendant must collaterally challenge that conviction by 
filing a federal habeas corpus or state postconviction petition. 
Still, Supreme Court decisions do not always apply to collateral review 
of convictions that became final before the Supreme Court issues its new 
opinion.  In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that “new” 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure should not apply to these cases.
66
  
Therefore, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are generally not 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
67
 
Federal and state courts applying Padilla have ruled differently on the 
issue of whether the case announced a new constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure.  If the Court in Padilla announced a new constitutional rule of 
 
noncitizens facing criminal charges.  The ninety-two-page guide’s purpose is to help judges 
and attorneys “in understanding the immigration consequences of an alien’s guilty plea in a 
criminal case.”  Id. 
63 Id. at i. 
64 See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 698 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Padilla . . . has no bearing on our decision in this case because we need not decide whether 
Wertz’s performance was deficient to reach our conclusion that Hutchings was not 
prejudiced and therefore not entitled to habeas relief.”); Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-
4938 (ARR), 2010 WL 2076020, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010) (“Even if petitioner’s 
motion were timely, and assuming that he has sufficiently shown that trial counsel failed to 
advise him or misadvised him of the immigration consequences of his plea under Padilla v. 
Kentucky, I cannot find that he would meet the second prong of Strickland.”). 
65 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
66 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the 
general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those 
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”). 
67 Id. 
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criminal procedure, as some lower courts have decided that it did, then it 
cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless it falls 
under two narrow exceptions.
68
  This Comment argues that Padilla applied 
the familiar Strickland v. Washington standard of effective assistance of 
counsel to a new set of facts.
69
  Therefore, retroactive application of 
Padilla’s rule is warranted. 
D. THE TEAGUE V. LANE STANDARD OF RETROACTIVITY 
1. The Teague v. Lane Decision 
The Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, which governs whether 
a decision can be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral 
review, provides the basis for evaluating the retroactivity of Padilla.
70
  
Under Teague, “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or 
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or “if 
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final.”
71
  Whereas new rules only apply to cases on 
collateral review in certain circumstances, rules already in existence 
(“dictated by precedent”) apply to cases on direct and collateral review.
72
 
In Teague, an African-American defendant argued that his conviction 
by an all-white jury violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury trial.
73
  
The defendant, on collateral appeal, urged the Court to conclude that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right because he was not “tried by a jury that 
was representative of the community.”74  He based his argument on Taylor 
v. Louisiana, where the Court held that under the Sixth Amendment the jury 
venire must be “drawn from a source fairly representative of the 
community.”
75
  A plurality of the Court, however, stated that it would not 
 
68 The two exceptions to the general non-retroactivity rule for cases on collateral review 
are: first, for a rule that places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond 
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” and second, for a “watershed 
rule[] of criminal procedure,” which essentially means that it “requires the observance of 
‘those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”  Id. at 311 
(citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971)). 
69 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
70 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
71 Id. at 301. 
72
See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
73 Teague, 489 U.S. at 292–93. 
74 Id. at 293, 299. 
75 Id. at 292 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).  The defendant 
also argued that he should benefit from Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Court changed the 
evidentiary standard for a defendant to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination when 
a prosecutor challenges members of the jury venire.  However, the Court rejected the 
2012] NONCITIZENS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1381 
address the central question: whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross 
section requirement should extend to the petit jury.
76
  The Court explained 
that the defendant’s proposal would constitute a new rule.
77
  The Court 
proceeded to analyze and reformulate its retroactivity jurisprudence, 
determining that even if it were to adopt the defendant’s proposed rule, as a 
new rule it would be inapplicable on collateral appeal.
78
 
Accordingly, the Teague Court concluded that a new constitutional 
rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases on direct 
review, but not to cases on collateral review.
79
  The Court noted that the 
distinction between cases on direct review versus collateral review is a 
sharp one.
80
  On direct review, a defendant directly appeals a finding of a 
lower court, and therefore, the defendant’s conviction is not yet final.  By 
contrast, on collateral review, the defendant’s conviction is final and the 
defendant is petitioning for relief from that conviction.
81
  However, if the 




Teague is considered a landmark decision
83
 because it rejected the ad 
hoc approach of Linkletter v. Walker and established a more concrete test 
for deciding whether a rule should be applied to cases on collateral 
review.
84
  The Court announced: 
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we 
do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule 
for retroactivity purposes.  In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it 
 
defendant’s contention based on its prior holding that Batson was not retroactive on 
collateral review.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 294–96 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–
97; Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258). 
76 Id. at 292. 
77 Id. at 301 (“Given the strong language in Taylor and our statement in Akins v. Texas, 
that ‘[f]airness in [jury] selection has never been held to require proportional representation 
of races upon a jury,’ application of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would 
be a new rule.”). 
78 Id. at 310. 
79 Id. at 310.  Notably, Teague has been determined to apply to procedural, not 
substantive, rules.  See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 2005); Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (“Teague by its own terms applies only to procedural 
rules . . . .”). 
80 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (noting “the important distinction between direct and 
collateral review”) (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 215 (1988)). 
81 See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58 (1985) (discussing the distinction 
between direct and collateral review). 
82 See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). 
83 Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the 
New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1870 (1997). 
84 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
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The Court also emphasized that when a court makes a decision announcing 
a new rule, it should also decide, at that time, if its decision is retroactive.
86
 
2. Teague v. Lane’s Progeny 
Teague v. Lane appears to have caused as much confusion as it sought 
to resolve.
87
  The Court itself has said that its Teague jurisprudence is 
“confused and confusing.”
88
  Although Teague remains good law and courts 
continue to apply the basic logic of the opinion, the reasoning behind 
subsequent decisions does not always appear consistent. 
Although Teague was a plurality opinion, later that same year, a 
majority of the Court endorsed it in Penry v. Lynaugh.
89
  In Penry, the 
defendant sought federal habeas relief from a murder conviction and 
sentence of death.
90
  The Court held that the rule that Penry sought to apply 
to his case was not a new rule.
91
  The rule had been articulated in Jurek v. 
Texas, where the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment required 
the person deciding the defendant’s sentence to be allowed to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence.
92
  According to the Court, Penry’s claim did 
not require the application of a new rule because “the relief Penry seeks 
does not ‘impos[e] a new obligation’ on the State of Texas . . . .  Rather, 




By contrast, a year later in Butler v. McKellar, the Court held that the 
 
85 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
86 Id. at 300 (“[W]hether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective 
or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] decision.”) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, 
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 56, 64 (1965)). 
87 See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of 
Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 815 (2003) (“[T]he ‘controversial 
jurisprudence of “new” law’ seems far from settled.”). 
88 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008). 
89 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see also Shannon, supra note 87, at 823. 
90 Penry, 492 U.S. at 302. 
91 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Penry sought the benefit of a rule that when 
mitigating evidence regarding his mental retardation and history of abuse is presented, Texas 
juries must “be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that 
mitigating evidence in determining whether a defendant should be sentenced to death.”  Id. 
at 315. 
92 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 
93 Penry, 492 U.S. at 315. 
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particular case upon which defendant relied, Arizona v. Roberson,
94
 
announced a new rule.  The Court stated that before Roberson, there was 
“significant difference of opinion” among lower courts, as well as between 
two federal courts of appeals dealing with the Roberson issue, showing that 
the result in Roberson was “susceptible to debate among reasonable 
minds.”
95
  Still, the Court added that whether a decision comes “within the 
‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision . . . is not conclusive for purposes of 
deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”
96
 
Just a few months later, in Sawyer v. Smith,
97
 the Supreme Court 
provided further explanation for the motivation behind its decision in 
Teague.  The Teague rule, the Court explained, attempts to “ensure that 
gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree 
are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when 
entered.”
98
  This purpose relates to the underlying goal of federal habeas 
corpus relief: “to ensure that state convictions comply with the federal law 
in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to provide a 
mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon 
later emerging legal doctrine.”
99
 
In Saffle v. Parks, the Court stated that to determine whether a new 
rule exists, a court must assess whether “a state court considering 
[defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt 
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [defendant] seeks 
was required by the Constitution.”
100
  The Court also declared, “[t]he 
explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule.”
101
  
Two years later, in Wright v. West, a state prisoner accused of grand larceny 
sought habeas corpus relief.
102
  The Court stated that a rule is new if it “can 
be meaningfully distinguished from that established by binding precedent at 
the time his state court conviction became final.”
103
  Furthermore: 
Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether ‘reasonable 
 
94 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
95 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). 
96 Id. 
97 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). 
98 Id. at 234. 
99 Id. 
100 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) 
(“[W]e will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state 
court, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively 
unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court.”). 
101 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488. 
102 505 U.S. 277, 282–84 (1992). 
103 Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
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jurists’ could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent . . . the standard 
for determining when a case establishes a new rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere 
existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.
104
 
In Whorton v. Bockting, the Court held that its 2004 decision in 
Crawford v. Washington announced a new constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure.
105
  Crawford announced a new rule because it was not “dictated” 
by precedent and its holding “[wa]s flatly inconsistent with the prior 
governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford overruled.”
106
  In other 
cases, the Court has said that asking whether a decision is “dictated by 
precedent” is the same as asking “whether no other interpretation was 
reasonable.”
107
  Similarly, a rule is not dictated by precedent unless it would 
be “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”
108
 
In sum, it would be overly optimistic to find a bright-line rule in 
Teague’s progeny.  Because Teague requires a case-by-case analysis, 
guidance can be found in the facts of a case and the rule a petitioner is 
asking to be applied.  The Court recently clarified that “the source of a ‘new 
rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of 
law.  Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our 




This Comment argues two points.  First, Padilla v. Kentucky applies 
the Strickland standard for effective assistance of counsel to a new set of 
facts; therefore it does not announce a new rule of criminal procedure.  
While courts applying Padilla diverge on the issue of retroactivity, many 
favor applying Padilla retroactively.  Moreover, the arguments for 
retroactivity are stronger than those in favor of only applying Padilla 
 
104 Id. 
105 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (“[W]hile [petitioner’s] appeal was pending, we issued our 
opinion in Crawford, in which we overruled Roberts and held that ‘[t]estimonial statements 
of witnesses absent from trial’ are admissible ‘only where the declarant is unavailable, and 
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].’”). 
106 Id. at 416.  For other cases applying this Teague standard, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 
552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004); Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000). 
107 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997) (“[T]he Teague inquiry—which is 
applied to Supreme Court decisions that are, one must hope, usually the most reasonable 
interpretation of prior law—requires more than that.  It asks whether Espinosa was dictated 
by precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable.”); see also Williams, 529 
U.S. at 381 (“[A] federal habeas court operates within the bounds of comity and finality if it 
applies a rule ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became 
final.’”) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). 
108 Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added). 
109 Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271. 
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prospectively.  Second, this Comment argues that Padilla can demonstrate 
“prejudice,” as required under Strickland. 
A. PADILLA’S IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH 
Judges across the country have lamented that the Padilla decision does 
not say if it should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
110
  
“Reasonable jurists” disagree about Padilla’s retroactive effect.
111
  As a 
result, some federal habeas petitioners can successfully challenge their 
convictions based on Padilla while others are barred from relying on 
Padilla at all. 
With federal circuit courts now split on whether Padilla can be 
retroactively applied, the U.S. Supreme Court may soon need to revisit 
Padilla.
112
  The Third Circuit first decided the issue, followed closely by the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits.
113
  In United States v. Orocio, the Third Circuit 
unanimously held that Padilla did not announce a new rule and can be 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.
114
  Rejecting the 
government’s argument, the Third Circuit held that “because Padilla 
followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional norms, 
it is an ‘old rule’ . . . and is retroactively applicable on collateral review.”
115
  
A split Seventh Circuit panel disagreed with the Third Circuit, finding in 
Chaidez v. United States that Padilla announced a new rule.
116
  The Seventh 
Circuit said it remained “persuaded by the weight of lower court authority 
that, in 2004, a jurist could reasonably have reached a conclusion contrary 
to the holding in Padilla.”
117
  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that Padilla 




110 See, e.g., Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at 
*1 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (“Padilla fails to resolve (or even discuss) retroactivity . . . .”); 
United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337 (LMB), 1:10cv618 (LMB), 2010 WL 
2400006, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010). 
111 People v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402 (JS), 2010 WL 2629748, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 
24, 2010); Llanes, 2011 WL 2473233, at *1 (“[N]o federal circuit court has addressed 
Padilla’s retroactivity.”). 
112 As of the date of publication, three federal circuit courts have ruled on the issue. 
113 United States v. Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 
2011); Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623, 2011 WL 3705173, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 
2011); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011). 
114 645 F.3d at 634.  Judge Chagares joined the majority’s decision that Padilla is 
retroactive, and only dissented on the question of whether Orocio was prejudiced by his 
counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Id. at 647. 
115 Id. at 641. 
116 Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *4. 
117 Id. at *6. 
118 Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1. 
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The Third Circuit’s sound judgment should guide other federal circuit 
courts, and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue of Padilla’s 
retroactivity.  Moreover, a number of decisions after Orocio suggest that 
courts outside of the Third Circuit are persuaded by Orocio’s reasoning.
119
 
By contrast, the Seventh and Tenth Circuit opinions fall short.  For 
example, the Chaidez majority adopted particular guiding principles under 
Teague and its progeny as “absolute,” despite the Supreme Court’s recent 
statement that its Teague jurisprudence is “confused and confusing.”
120
  The 
majority also claimed that Padilla was not dictated by precedent in part 
because the competing Padilla opinions expressed an “array of views” and 
lower courts were split on the issue.
121
  Neither of these reasons is 
dispositive in a new rule analysis, as explained below.  In addition, the 
Chaidez majority conceded that its holding considered Padilla a “rare 
exception” to the rule that “the application of Strickland to unique facts 
generally will not produce a new rule,” and that Strickland can resolve 
“virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”122  But the majority 
explained that Padilla was a “rare exception” only because the Court had 
never before stated Padilla’s exact rule and because, if Padilla were an old 
rule, it would be “hard to imagine an application of Strickland that would 
qualify as a new rule.”
123
  However, as Judge Williams argued in dissent, 
Padilla “simply clarified that a violation of [prevailing professional norms] 
amounts to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.”
124 
Even before the courts of appeals ruled, a number of lower courts 
applied Padilla retroactively.
125
  A New York state court held that Padilla 
 
119 Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:10–CV–23718–WKW [WO], 2011 WL 3419614, 
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2011) (“[T]he strong authority that Padilla is not a new rule, 
including the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Orocio, and the authorities cited therein, 
should have put litigants on notice of potential claims long before Padilla was handed 
down.”); Song v. United States, Nos. CV 09–5184 DOC, CR 98–0806 CM, 2011 WL 
2940316, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011) (“The instant Court’s conclusion that Padilla set 
forth on ‘old rule’ to be applied retroactively on collateral review accords with the only 
published circuit court decision on this issue.”) (citing Orocio, 645 F.3d 630); Constanza v. 
State, No. A10-2096, 2011 WL 3557824, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011). 
120 Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *7; Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008). 
121 Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *11. 
122 Id. at *7. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *9. 
125 See, e.g., Amer v. United States, No. 1:06CR118–GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *2 
(N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011); Luna v. United States, No. 10CV1659-JLS(POR), 2010 WL 
4868062, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010); United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 
2010 WL 3184150, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-
040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 
806, 809 (App. Term 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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should be applied retroactively because the case “did not announce a new 
constitutional rule, but merely applied the well-settled rule of Strickland to 
a particular set of facts.”
126
  Reasoning that Padilla did not overrule any 
“clear past precedent,” the court cited as support the Supreme Court’s 2000 
opinion in Williams v. Taylor.
127
  In Williams, the Court addressed the 
retroactivity of a case that applied Strickland and concluded that “it can 
hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States.’”
128
  Similar to the New 
York court, a California district court held that Padilla should be applied 
retroactively because it “evinced an old rule.”
129
  In Texas, a petitioner was 
allowed to benefit from Padilla even though he was convicted fourteen 
years before Padilla was handed down.
130
  The Colorado Court of Appeals 
did not decide if Padilla was retroactive but nevertheless said that Colorado 




By contrast, some federal and state courts proclaim that Padilla should 
not be applied retroactively.
132
  In People v. Kabre, a defendant sought 
relief from three convictions related to trademark counterfeiting.  He argued 
that his counsel failed to advise him that there might be immigration 
consequences to his guilty plea.  In response, the New York trial court held 
that Padilla announced a new rule and “is not to be applied retroactively on 
collateral review of misdemeanor convictions.”
133
  The court applied the 
Teague standard to determine if Padilla was dictated by precedent.
134
  The 
court explained that not only did Padilla come to the opposite conclusion as 
 
126 People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (Crim. Ct. 2010); see also Hubenig, 2010 
WL 2650625, at *5 (“[S]pecific applications of Strickland do not generally establish a new 
rule for purposes of Teague.”). 
127 Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 699. 
128 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). 
129 Luna, 2010 WL 4868062, at *3. 
130 Guadarrama-Melo v. United States, No. 1:08–CV–588, 2011 WL 2433619, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. May 2, 2011). 
131 People v. Kazadi, No. 09CA2640, 2011 WL 724754, at *3 (Colo. App. Mar. 3, 2011). 
132 See, e.g., Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at 
*2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply 
retroactively); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 2011) (stating that 
Padilla announced a new rule); Haddad v. United States, Civil No. 07-12540, Criminal No. 
97-80150, 2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010) (stating it is unlikely that 
Padilla will be applied retroactively). 
133 People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (Crim. Ct. 2010). 
134 Id. at 892 (“Petitioner can prevail here only if a New York court in 2005 (when the 
last conviction at issue here became final) would have been required by controlling United 
States Supreme Court precedent to rule that failure to discuss the immigration consequences 
of a guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
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the New York Court of Appeals did in 1995,
135
 but it also overruled a 
significant number of federal and state court decisions.
136
  On the other 
hand, the court acknowledged that before Padilla, New York precedent 
dictated that where defense counsel does give advice about immigration 
consequences, that advice should not be incorrect.
137
  Still, the court 
declined to apply Padilla retroactively, “at least with respect to a 
misdemeanor conviction,” because, the court said, in contrast to the 
immigration consequences of a felony conviction, the immigration 
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction are “often unclear.”
138
 
Some courts decline to conclude anything about Padilla’s retroactivity 
at all.
139
  Others decide the issue without much reasoning,
140
 or based on 
disjointed or confusing reasoning.  In United States v. Shafeek, pro se 
defendant Shafeek collaterally attacked his bank fraud conviction.
141
  
Finding first that “it appears that the rule announced [by Padilla] is not a 
‘new rule,’” the Michigan district court held that “Shafeek cannot show that 
the Padilla opinion should be applied retroactively.”
142
  This reasoning is 
confused: if Padilla did not announce a new rule, then by default it was an 
old rule, and therefore Shafeek could show that the decision should be 
applied retroactively.  Similarly, in Gacko v. United States, although the 
parties did not raise the issue, the New York district court judge addressed 
Padilla by finding that it did not support the defendant’s case because the 
defendant could not show prejudice.
143
  The judge stated that “[w]hile this 
decision clarified the obligation of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 
I cannot find that is a ‘newly recognized’ right that was made retroactively 
 
135 See People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995) (“Deportation is a collateral 
consequence of conviction because it is a result peculiar to the individual’s personal 
circumstances and one not within the control of the court system.  Therefore, our Appellate 
Division and the Federal courts have consistently held that the trial court need not, before 
accepting a plea of guilty, advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation.”). 
136 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 895. 
137 Id. at 890. 
138 Id. 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337 (LMB), 1:10cv618 
(LMB), 2010 WL 2400006, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010) (concluding, with little 
reasoning, that defendant could not rely on Padilla to support his habeas petition). 
140 People v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402 (JS), 2010 WL 2629748, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 
24, 2010) (finding that the Supreme Court was not clear on whether Padilla applies 
retroactively and, “given this uncertainty, and the weakness of [defendant’s] substantive 
claims, the Court elects to assume arguendo that Padilla applies retroactively”). 
141 United States v. Shafeek, No. 05-81129, 2010 WL 3789747, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 
22, 2010). 
142 Id. at *3. 
143 Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938 (ARR), 2010 WL 2076020, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 20, 2010). 
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applicable to cases on collateral review as required by the statute.”
144
 
B. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
Padilla v. Kentucky should be applied retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.  Padilla did not announce a new constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure because it applied the Strickland standard to a new set of 
facts.  As others have acknowledged, “[t]he notion that a defense attorney 
has a duty to advise his client properly before a plea is not new . . . .  
[E]xpanding the rights of noncitizens at the time of plea based upon a 




Determining whether a decision is retroactive is hardly clear-cut.  The 
Supreme Court itself has recognized the difficulty in determining whether a 
decision actually announces a new rule, or “whether it has simply applied a 
well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely 
analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case 
law.”
146
  Padilla, however, falls within the latter category: it applied a well-
established constitutional principle, the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, to a case similar to prior cases. 
The strongest support for this argument is the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Williams v. Taylor.  Williams suggested that where a court recognizes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, it generally does not announce a 
new rule.
147
  Even if Williams cannot be read to announce such a categorical 
rule, Teague v. Lane still mandates a finding that Padilla did not announce 
a new rule.  Accordingly, Padilla did not announce a new rule because (1) 
Williams suggested a categorical rule for ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, (2) Padilla was based on “clearly established” law, (3) Padilla was 
dictated by precedent, (4) in the opinion, the Court indicated that it should 
be applied retroactively, and finally (5) both practical and policy concerns 
weigh in favor of Padilla’s retroactivity. 
1. Williams v. Taylor 
The question of Padilla’s retroactivity can be best answered by 
looking at the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams v. Taylor.  The Court in 
 
144 Id. 
145 John L. Holahan & Shauna Faye Kieffer, Padilla Motions, BENCH & BAR OF MINN., 
Aug. 2010, at 26 (emphasis added). 
146 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969). 
147 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[I]t can hardly be said that 
recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation 
on the States.’”). 
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Williams addressed the question of how far the Strickland standard extends 
before a new rule is announced.  In the case, petitioner Williams sought 
federal habeas relief from his capital murder conviction and the death 
penalty.  Williams contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present significant mitigating evidence.
148
  As an initial matter, the Court 
had to decide whether Williams sought to apply a new or old rule.  It found 
the question “easily answered” because “[i]t is past question that the rule set 
forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”
149
  Further, “it can 
hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States.’”
150
  The Court explained 
that its precedent “dictated” that the Virginia Supreme Court apply 
Strickland to Williams’s claim.
151
  Therefore, Williams suggests that where 
a court recognizes a right to ineffective assistance of counsel, it generally 
does not announce a new rule.  A number of recent Supreme Court 
decisions also support this argument.
152
 
2. “Clearly Established” Law 
Even if Williams cannot be read to announce such a categorical rule, 
the “clearly established” standard mandates a finding that Padilla did not 
announce a new rule.  Teague’s prohibition on “reliance on ‘new rules’” has 
been described as “the functional equivalent of a statutory provision 
commanding exclusive reliance on ‘clearly established law.’”
153
  This 
statutory provision, part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA),
154
 requires a state court in habeas proceedings to decide if a 
defendant should be granted relief based on “clearly established Federal 
 
148 Id. at 370–71. 
149 Id. at 391. 
150 Id. (“If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case 
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without 
saying that those applications themselves create a new rule.”). 
151 Id. 
152 See United States v. Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) 
(“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions applying the 
Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has been 
afforded new rule status under Teague.”); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383, 
393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. 
153 Glenda K. Harnad, Construction and Application of Teague Rule Concerning 
Whether Constitutional Rule of Criminal Procedure Applies Retroactively to Case on 
Collateral Review—Supreme Court Cases, 44 A.L.R. FED. 2D 557, 569–70 (2010). 
154 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2006). 
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law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
155
  As stated 
in Williams, the “source of clearly established law” is restricted to “this 
Court’s jurisprudence.”
156
  Later in her opinion, Justice O’Connor stated 
that “the ‘clearly established Federal law’ phrase bears only a slight 
connection to our Teague jurisprudence.”
157
  However, Justice O’Connor 
did not specify what the exact standard under Teague is or should be.
158
  
Furthermore, a number of scholars have suggested that distinguishing new 
and old rules under Teague requires looking at clearly established Federal 
law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
159
 
Therefore, like in Williams, the law in question in Padilla was the 
Strickland rule, which the Court has held qualifies as “clearly established 
Federal law.”  If neither Williams nor the “clearly established” standard 
resolves the question of Padilla’s retroactivity, other factors weigh in favor 
of finding that Padilla did not announce a new rule. 
3. “Dictated by Precedent” 
The argument that Padilla “was not dictated by precedent existing at 
the time the defendant’s conviction became final”
160
 falls short because 
every new application of an old precedent is not automatically labeled a 
new rule.  As an initial matter, “dictated by precedent” is open to 
interpretation.
161
  Scholars note that the Supreme Court has suggested that 
the phrase “dictated by precedent” should not be interpreted too 
narrowly.
162
  In Stringer v. Black, the Court found that “[t]he purpose of the 
new rule doctrine is to validate reasonable interpretations of existing 
precedents.”
163
  Both Supreme Court and lower court precedent supports the 
argument that the conclusion in Padilla was a reasonable interpretation of 
 
155 Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402–03 (2000) (quoting § 2254) (emphasis added). 
156 Id. at 412. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. 
159 See, e.g., Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 7, at 367 (2010) (stating that 
while one federal circuit court has stated otherwise, “[t]here is considerable authority 
supporting the proposition that only the United States Supreme Court can establish a ‘new 
rule’ of constitutional law for Teague purposes”). 
160 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
161 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(d) (3d ed. 2007) (“[I]n 
Teague, it was far from clear as to how literally lower courts should read Justice O’Connor’s 
reference to a result ‘not dictated’ by precedent.”). 
162 Id.; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318–19 (1989). 
163 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992).  The Court specified that “[r]easonableness, in this as in 
many other contexts, is an objective standard, and the ultimate decision whether [the 
decision at issue] was dictated by precedent is based on an objective reading of the relevant 
cases.”  Id. 
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existing precedent. 
i. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
In Sawyer v. Smith, the Supreme Court interpreted “dictated by 
precedent” to mean that a new rule is announced where “we do not think a 
state court viewing petitioner’s case at the time his conviction became final 
could have concluded that our Eighth Amendment precedents compelled 
such a rule.”
164
  The Court in Padilla, by contrast, explained that the rule 
obliging counsel to tell clients about deportation risks is based on “[o]ur 
longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents.”
165
  Therefore, at the time 
Padilla’s conviction became final, a state court could have concluded that 
the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment precedents compelled the rule 
requiring counsel to inform him of deportation risks. 
The result in Padilla was grounded in Supreme Court precedent.
166
  
First, the Court itself stated that it has never distinguished between 
collateral and direct consequences in a Sixth Amendment effective 
assistance of counsel case.
167
  Although deportation has historically been 
viewed as a collateral consequence of a conviction,
168
 it would nevertheless 
fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.  In Hill v. Lockhart, the 
Supreme Court declined to create a categorical rule barring collateral 
consequences from the scope of what an attorney was obligated to tell a 
client.
169
  Second, prior Supreme Court decisions recognize the importance 
of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea.  In INS v. St. Cyr, the 
Court acknowledged that “alien defendants considering whether to enter 
into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of 
their convictions.”
170
  The Court then quoted Matthew Bender: 
“[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more 
important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”
171
 
Furthermore, no Supreme Court opinion foreclosed the possibility that 
the Court would reach the conclusion that it did in Padilla.  Padilla did not 
overrule any prior Supreme Court decision because the Court has never 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not include the right to 
 
164 497 U.S. 227, 238 (1990). 
165 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1481. 
168 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008), 
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). 
169 474 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (noting that the court below, the Eighth Circuit, decided that 
parole eligibility is a collateral, not direct, consequence of a guilty plea). 
170 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001). 
171 Id. at 322–23 (citations omitted). 
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be advised of potential immigration consequences.  Admittedly, if a 
decision did not explicitly overrule a prior decision, it is more difficult to 
determine if a new rule was created.
172
  However, cases where the Supreme 
Court announces a new rule often explicitly overrule a prior decision.  For 
example, Crawford v. Washington announced a new rule because it 
overruled Ohio v. Roberts.
173
  In Allen v. Hardy, the Court held that the rule 
in Batson v. Kentucky was “an explicit and substantial break with prior 
precedent” because it “overruled [a] portion of Swain.”
174
 
ii. Lower Court Precedent 
Some scholars note that Padilla effectively overruled a number of state 
and federal decisions.
175
  However, as seen in Sawyer, the Court’s focus is 
on whether a state court “could have concluded that our Eighth Amendment 
precedents compelled such a rule.”
176
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s 
Sixth Amendment precedent determines whether the Court announced a 
new rule in Padilla.  The focus should not be on how many lower court 
opinions the Court overruled.  A finding that federal or state courts have 
ruled contrary to a Supreme Court’s decision is not dispositive of whether 
the Supreme Court announced a new rule. 
Courts have found that a Supreme Court opinion overruling precedents 
from several federal circuits nevertheless did not announce a new rule.  In 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court held that Strickland applies where 
defense counsel fails to file a notice of appeal on behalf of a client.
177
  As a 
result, the Court overruled the per se rule from several federal circuits 
stating that “defense counsel had a duty to file a notice of appeal in all 
cases, except where the defendant affirmatively consented to refrain from 
filing an appeal.”
178
  Later, the Ninth Circuit held that Flores-Ortega did 
not announce a new rule, stating: “Flores-Ortega broke no new ground in 
holding that reasonably effective performance requires a defense attorney to 
discuss an appeal with her client whenever there is a rational basis to think 
 
172 See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (“The explicit overruling of an 
earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine 
whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.”). 
173 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). 
174 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986). 
175 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 
204 (2010) (“While the decision is not inconsistent with the Court’s prior opinions, it 
overturns nearly unanimous agreement among state and federal courts.”). 
176 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 238 (1990) (emphasis added). 
177 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
178 Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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that her client should appeal.”
179
  The court explained that Strickland’s 
application to ineffective assistance of counsel claims was well-established 
and the ruling in Flores-Ortega was supported by American Bar 
Association standards and indications in the Court’s own precedent.
180
 
Yet one New York judge observed that Padilla “overruled decisions 
from ten of the federal circuit courts and twenty-three states, and certainly 
has in this sense established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”
181
  In United 
States v. Fry, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that counsel was not 
deficient for failing to tell the defendant that he could be deported as a 
result of a conviction.
182
  Looking to other circuits, the Ninth Circuit found 
consensus that “deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal 
process and hence the failure to advise does not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”
183
  However, other courts have found that erroneous 




The Supreme Court has “long required effective assistance of counsel 
on all important decisions in plea bargaining that could affect the outcome 
of the plea process.”
185
  Therefore, the claim that Padilla overturned 
 
179 Id. at 1142. 
180 Id. at 1141–42.  The Court noted that “both from Supreme Court precedent and as a 
matter of common sense . . . the decision whether to appeal requires reasoned legal advice 
from counsel.”  Id. at 1142. 
181 People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 896 (Crim. Ct. July 22, 2010) (“‘Dictated by 
precedent’ is not the only formulation of the rule.  Another factor is whether the Supreme 
Court has overruled past authority: a decision which overrules a prior case is obviously a 
new rule.  Padilla did not . . . overrule any prior Supreme Court decision because there were 
no prior decisions which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel applied to advice on a consequence hithertofore considered collateral.  The decision 
in Padilla effectively did overrule decisions from ten of the federal circuit courts and twenty-
three states, and certainly has in this sense established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”) 
(citation omitted). 
182 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 
183 Id. (quoting United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also United 
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 
7 (4th Cir. 1988). 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Choi, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (“I assume without deciding 
that the attorney had no duty to advise Choi on the subject of deportation at all.  But when 
Choi asked, the attorney could not properly provide an incorrect answer, without making an 
objectively reasonable effort to learn the truth.”).  It should be noted that while the Court 
acknowledged the misadvice versus failure to advise distinction in Padilla, it ultimately 
refused to make the distinction in reaching its holding.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1484 (2010) (“There is no relevant difference ‘between an act of commission and an act of 
omission’ in this context.”). 
185 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 638 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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“unanimous” judicial agreement overstates the reality because many recent 
federal and state court rulings in fact paved the way for Padilla.
186
  
According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla correctly pointed out 
that “a number of jurisdictions which have held that failure to advise of a 
collateral matter is not ineffective assistance have nevertheless held that 
there is an exception for cases where the attorney misadvised the defendant 
on the consequences of his plea with regard to immigration.”
187
  In 2002, 
the Second Circuit held that “affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to 
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively 
unreasonable.”
188
  In another opinion, the Second Circuit stated that 
removal for noncitizens is “not merely a collateral matter outside the scope 
of counsel’s duty to provide effective representation.”
189
  In 2004, the 
Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that a defense attorney was ineffective 
because he misrepresented to his client that there would be no negative 
immigration consequences of her guilty plea.
190
  The New Mexico Supreme 
Court, departing from Tenth Circuit precedent, ruled that an “attorney’s 
non-advice to an alien defendant on the immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea would also be deficient performance.”
191
 
4. Indications of Retroactivity in the Padilla Decision 
Some courts claim that Padilla is devoid of any indication that it 
should be applied retroactively.
192
  Yet several passages in the opinion 
suggest that the Court expected retroactive application.  The Court stated: 
It seems unlikely that our decision today will be have a significant effect on those 
convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.  For at least the past 15 
 
186 Id. at 640 (“Lower court decisions not in harmony with Padilla were, with few 
exceptions, decided before 1995 and pre-date the professional norms that, as the Padilla 
court recognized, had long demanded that competent counsel provide advice on the removal 
consequences of a client’s plea.”). 
187 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008) (citing State v. Rojas-
Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 935 (Utah 2005)); see also United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. 
United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539–41 (11th Cir. 1985)); Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921 
(Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
188 Cuoto, 311 F.3d at 188. 
189 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 
1986)) (“Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen’s 
ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing 
process—not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel’s duty to provide 
effective representation.”). 
190 Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 799–800 (Ga. 2004). 
191 State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
192 See, e.g., United States v. Shafeek, Nos. 05-81129, 10-12670, 2010 WL 3789747, at 
*2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). 
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years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide 
advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s plea.
193
 
The Court also found it “significant that the plea form currently used in 
Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration consequences.”
194
 
Finally, the argument for Padilla’s retroactivity is grounded in the 
reality that although our fundamental constitutional principles do not 
change, the nation does.
195
  Strickland, in particular, is not stagnant: 
“Strickland did not freeze into place the objective standards of attorney 
performance prevailing in 1984, never to change again.”
196
 
5. Practical and Policy Considerations 
Even if Padilla were determined to be a new rule and therefore non-
retroactive, a state court can still decide to give effect to Padilla in deciding 
a case on collateral review.  The Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota 
held that the Teague rule does not prohibit state courts from giving “broader 
effect” to a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure than required by 
the Supreme Court in the opinion at issue.
197
  Limiting the Teague rule to 
the context of federal habeas relief means that Teague does not necessarily 
impact state courts considering postconviction petitions. 
Moreover, the concern that Padilla will open the “floodgates” for 
defendants seeking to challenge their convictions is likely unfounded.  The 
Supreme Court deemed it “unlikely” that its decision would have 
“significant effect” on already final convictions.
198
  Professional norms 
already obligate attorneys to give clients advice about the risk of 
deportation in guilty pleas.
199
  Additionally, the cases decided since Padilla 
 
193 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485; see also People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (Crim. 
Ct. 2010) (“[I]f the Supreme Court did not intend for Padilla to be retroactively applied, that 
would render meaningless the majority’s lengthy discussion about concerns that Padilla 
would open the ‘floodgates’ of challenges to guilty pleas.”). 
194 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 n.15. 
195 In Justice Harlan’s words: “One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to 
recognize that many, though not all, of this Court’s constitutional decisions are grounded 
upon fundamental principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, 
but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation.”  
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
196 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) 
(emphasizing that Strickland relies “on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards”). 
197 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (“The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the 
authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is 
required by that opinion.  We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does 
not.”). 
198 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
199 Id. 
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demonstrate that defendants still face many hurdles to obtaining relief.  
These hurdles include the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas 
petitions and the limits of postconviction remedies.
200
  In addition, as will 
be discussed below, a successful Strickland claim requires the defendant to 
show he or she was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. 
In sum, Padilla should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review because it did not overrule any Supreme Court decision and finds 
support in Supreme Court, federal, and state precedent. 
C. PADILLA SHOULD PREVAIL UNDER STRICKLAND’S “PREJUDICE 
PRONG” 
The Kentucky Supreme Court has not yet decided the question on 
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court: whether Jose Padilla is entitled to 
relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
201
  The Kentucky 
court must address whether a noncitizen defendant who has entered a guilty 
plea for a crime can show prejudice under the standard established in 
Strickland where his counsel failed to advise him that his guilty plea could 
lead to his forced removal from the United States.  Padilla succeeded in 
showing that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”
202
  However, Padilla must now demonstrate that his 
counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
203
 
1. Demonstrating “Prejudice” in the Context of a Guilty Plea 
The Supreme Court noted that on remand, Padilla may face an uphill 
battle: “it is often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged 
their guilt to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.”
204
  The prejudice prong 
requires the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”
205
  A reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
206
  The Supreme Court requires a 
defendant to show prejudice because “[a]n error by counsel, even if 
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of 
 
200 See, e.g., Diaz v. Brown, No. 10-CV-0457M, 2011 WL 677476, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 16, 2011); State v. Chavez, 246 P.3d 1219, 1219–20 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
201 Id. at 1487. 
202 Id. at 1486–87; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
203 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
204 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12.  The Court also states that “[s]urmounting 
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”  Id. at 1485. 
205 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
206 Id. 
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a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”
207
  




To assess prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a court must apply 
the legal standard found in Hill v. Lockhart
209
: “in order to satisfy the 
‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial.”
210
  In Hill v. Lockhart, the 
petitioner’s argument failed because he did not allege that if counsel 
properly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have 
chosen to go to trial instead of pleading guilty.
211
  In addition, petitioner 
“alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he 
placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or 
not to plead guilty.”
212
 
In some cases, a defendant need not show that rejecting a plea bargain 
“would have been rational under the circumstances” because prejudice may 
be presumed.
213
  The Supreme Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega established 
that prejudice must be presumed where there is a “serious denial of the 
entire judicial proceeding.”
214
  Flores-Ortega was an “unusual” case 
because the reliability of the judicial proceeding was not in question.
215
  
Instead, counsel’s errors “deprived respondent of more than a fair judicial 
proceeding; that deficiency deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding 
altogether.”
216
  The Court explained: “Like the decision whether to appeal, 
the decision whether to plead guilty (i.e., waive trial) rested with the 
defendant and, like this case, counsel’s advice in Hill might have caused the 
defendant to forfeit a judicial proceeding to which he was otherwise 
 
207 Id. at 691. 
208 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the 
Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will 
turn on the facts of a particular case.”). 
209 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The governing legal standard plays a critical role in 
defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors.”); see also 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12 (“Whether Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from 
Hill [v. Lockhart] . . . .”). 
210 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
211 Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. 
212 Id. at 60. 
213 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 
214 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
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entitled.”
217
  The Supreme Court also stated that “grossly deficient 
performance” by counsel may constitute prejudice.
218
 
Even if prejudice is not presumed, a defendant can demonstrate that it 
would have been rational for him to reject a plea offer.
219
  As the Third 
Circuit stressed in United States v. Orocio, the inquiry is whether the 
attorney’s ineffective conduct “affected the outcome of the plea process.”
220
  
The Supreme Court “has never required an affirmative demonstration of 
likely acquittal at such a trial as the sine qua non of prejudice.”
221
  A court 
should ask only whether the defendant would have “rationally gone to trial 
in the first place.”
222
  This rationality test should be straightforward for a 
noncitizen defendant like Padilla who “might rationally be more concerned 




2. The Case for Padilla 
On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court should focus on whether 
counsel’s performance affected the outcome of the plea process, not what 
the outcome of Padilla’s hypothetical trial would have been.
224
  The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Padilla should have gone further to acknowledge the 
impact of Flores-Ortega on Padilla’s case.  Like the defendant in Flores-
Ortega, Padilla was denied “the entire judicial proceeding,” any trial at all, 
because of his counsel’s erroneous advice.
225
  Furthermore, some courts 
have found that prejudice is “self-evident” where a noncitizen defendant 
faces deportation because of counsel’s errors.
226
 
Even if the Kentucky court does not presume prejudice or find that it is 
“self-evident” in Padilla’s case, Padilla can still prevail.  To succeed, 
Padilla must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance affected the plea 
process and that his alternative “decision to reject the plea bargain would 
 
217 Id. at 485. 
218 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 471. 
219 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 
220 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483). 
224 See United States v. Denedo, NMCCA 9900680, 2010 WL 996432, at *3 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2010) (“In many guilty plea cases the prejudice inquiry will involve a 
determination whether without counsel’s error, counsel would have made a different 
recommendation as to the plea.” (citing United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 247 (C.A.A.F. 
1997))). 
225 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000). 
226 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frometa, 531 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
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have been rational under the circumstances.”
227
  He certainly does not need 
to “show that he would have been acquitted at a trial.”
228
  Padilla’s 
counsel’s performance undoubtedly affected the plea process: Padilla 
argued that he was “substantially induced by his attorney’s mistaken advice 
regarding his immigration status.”
229
 
Next, Padilla can show that a decision to go to trial would have been 
rational.  Unlike the defendant in Hill, Padilla can allege “special 
circumstances” to support the conclusion that he would place “particular 
emphasis” on his immigration status in deciding whether to plead guilty.
 230
  
The Supreme Court has stressed on multiple occasions that “[p]reserving 
the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to 
the client than any potential jail sentence.”
231
 
Simply put, faced with the choice of either going to trial or accepting a 
plea bargain that would certainly result in mandatory deportation, a rational 
person in Padilla’s position would likely choose to go to trial.  Faced with 
the same decision and the same “dire immigration consequences,” the Third 
Circuit held that the defendant, Orocio, would have reasonably chosen to go 
to trial even though he faced an aggravated felony charge with a minimum 
ten-year sentence.
232
  The court thus held that Orocio “alleged sufficient 
prejudice under Strickland” to warrant a remand.
233
  In the same way, it 
would have been reasonable for Padilla to go to trial instead of suffering the 
automatic “dire immigration consequences” of a guilty plea, even though he 
faced drug trafficking charges.  Padilla explicitly raised with counsel his 
serious concerns about potential immigration consequences.
234
  As the 
Second Circuit has held, a defendant’s statements regarding what he would 
have done in a plea bargain “in combination with some objective evidence, 
such as a significant sentencing disparity, is sufficient to support a prejudice 
 
227 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 
228 United States v. Choi, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2008).  The Supreme 
Court has stated that this is particularly important in cases involving indigent defendants: 
“[I]t is unfair to require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his 
hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record 
in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal.”  Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
at 486. 
229 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2008). 
230 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985). 
231 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001)). 
232 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 645 (3d Cir. 2011). 
233 Id. at 636. 
234 As a Kentucky Supreme Court judge pointed out, Padilla “raised the issue [of 
deportation] himself.”  Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (Cunningham, J., dissenting). 
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finding.”
235
  Here, Padilla’s statements in combination with the objective 
evidence—certain deportation from his home of forty years, the United 
States—should be sufficient to support a prejudice finding. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many questions remain following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, including whether it should have retroactive effect and 
whether Padilla was prejudiced.  Federal circuit courts recently deciding the 
issue are split, indicating that the Supreme Court may have to revisit its 
decision.  This Comment argued that Padilla should be applied 
retroactively because it did not announce a new constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure, but rather applied the existing Strickland v. Washington 
standard of effective assistance of counsel to a new set of facts.  On remand 
to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla should prevail on his Strickland 
claim. 
Immigration law in the United States today can have devastating 
consequences for individuals and families—its growing use as a tool for 
deportation separates families, uproots the working lives of thousands of 
people, and has significant consequences for the economy of a country so 
dependent on foreign labor.  How the questions remaining from Padilla 
play out in the coming months and years will tell much about how the legal 
system’s treatment of noncitizens in criminal proceedings is likely to 
unfold.  Padilla may come to signal the legal community’s recognition of 
the close link between immigration and criminal law.  It may also signal 
that the legal community is moving further toward acknowledging that 
criminal punishment for a noncitizen is different from punishment for a 
citizen.  Practically speaking, however, few defendants may actually feel 
Padilla’s impact because the “prejudice” prong of Strickland v. Washington 
is often difficult to prove. 
  
 
235 United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
1402 KARA B. MURPHY [Vol. 101 
 
